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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COURTS-INJUNcTIoN AGAINST USE OF AIR BY RADio.-There was an agreement
between the State Marketing Commissioner who operates Radio Broadcasting
Station W 0 S, and plaintiff who operates Radio Broadcasting Station K L D S
on same wave length, to have a division of hours for broadcasting so as not to
interfere with each other, which was broken by the defendant. Suit in equity to
enjoin defendant from further interfering. Held, that federal courts have juris-
diction, and that the observance of a condition in a radio license is enforceable
by injunction. Carmichael v. Anderson, 14 Fed. (2d) 166.
This decision brings up the very interesting question of who has a right to the
use of the air. In cases where the broadcasting station has power to transmit
messages from one state to another, the federal courts have jurisdiction as to
agreements to broadcast, and licenses, under U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 10100. And
while the Secretary of Commerce, by U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 10101, may grant
licenses only in accordance with the provisions of the legislative act, still he may
issue licenses with restrictions which the parties interested may agree upon.
Carmichael v. Anderson, supra. 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 100 states, "The transmission
of messages by wireless telegraphy is commerce, and the power of the United
States to regulate commerce and to preserve the territorial integrity of this
country does not depend upon the means employed, but the end attained." This
clearly indicates an intention to make some stand toward regulating the use of
the air so that there will be no undue congestion.
This proposition as to the right of way of the air has been very little litigated.
The only questions which the courts have so far decided are those having to
do with copyright infringements, Remick v. Automobile Accessories Co., 5 Fed.
(2d) 411; Witmark v. Bamberger Co., 291 Fed. 776; and those having to do
with municipally owned stations, Fletcher v. Hylan, 211 N. Y. S. 397, deciding
that municipal corporations may own broadcasting stations. C. H. L. '28.
DAMAGES-INTEREsT-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN GENERAL-DEMIANDS NOT
LIQUIDATED -Plaintiff, Olson, was employed by defendants to procure coal leases
for them and as a result of his efforts, defendants were able to secure leases
on about 6,000 acres of land and paid plaintiff $7,000, this amount to apply on
the cost of his services. There being no express contract for compensation,
this suit is one on a quantum meruit to recover the claimed balance due for
said services. Held, that in an action for services rendered, plaintiff is entitled
to interest from the time of completion of services on the amount found to be
due him, although such amount was previously in dispute. Olson v. Shuler et al.,
(Iowa 1926) 210 N. W. 453.
An unliquidated claim with reference to the allowance of interest, has been
defined as one which is undetermined as to certainty of amount. At common
law, the rule was that interest was not recoverable upon unliquidated demands
but was allowable only after such demands shall have become merged in a
judgment, Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Emerman, 191 Ill. App. 530. The reason,
of course, was that the defendant did not know what sum was due and hence
could not discharge his debt, until the amount of same was rendered certain,
as by a judgment, Lowell v. Shortbill, 103 Kan. 904, 176 P. 647. This rule has
been modified by modern decisions so that interest is allowed even in the case
of unliquidated demands when the amount is readily ascertainable by mere
computation or by reference to existing, well established market values, Cox v.
McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 18 P. 100; or when the failure to determine on a fixed
amount was through the defendant's fault, McMahon v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co., 20
N. Y. 463. This rule as modified has found frequent application in cases of
unliquidated demands for service rendered, Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 18
P. 100. In some jurisdictions, interest is allowed from the date of the writ
starting the proceedings, Brewer v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 12 Pick. (Mass.)
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547, while in others there is no interest except from the date of rendering judg-
ment, American Hawaiian, etc. Co. v. Butler, 17 Cal. App. 764, 121 P. 709. Thus,
it can readily be seen that states vary as to the exact date from which interest
is to be allowed in cases of quantum meruit but none of them, with the excep-
tion of Iowa, allow it from a date previous to that of the commencement of the
suit, in the absence of any statute, of course. In Missouri, we have an express
statute covering the subject, R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 6491, which provides that 6%
interest per annum shall be allowed on all moneys when due and payable on
written contracts and on accounts when they become due and after demand is
made. Such a demand may be express; may be by personal service of process,
Wolff v. Matthews, 98 Mo. 246, 11 S. W. 563; may be by institution of suit,
Evans v. Western Brass Mfg. Co., 118 Mo. 548, 24 S. W. 175; may be by filing
of counterclaim, First National Bank v. Laughlin, 305 Mo. 8,264 S. W. 706,
however, such interest must be demanded in the petition to recover it from a
date prior to that of judgment, Morley v. City of St. Joseph, 112 Mo. App. 671,
87 S. W. 1013. Thus in Missouri a party is entitled to interest from date of
demand if one is made; if not from date of service of process and if no proof
of this from date of commencement of suit.
From this brief review it would seem that the Iowa court in following prec-
edent in that state decided the case on principle directly opposed to those
generally prevalent, and in the absence of any express statute sanctioning such
action. E. L. W. '28.
GAMING-GAMBLING CONTRACTS AND TRANSACTIONs-RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
OF PARTIES-REcOVERY OF PAYMEN.-Plaintiff in this case is suing to recover
back money paid to the defendant on an agreement for the purchase and sale
of cotton "on margin," commonly called dealing in futures, where plaintiff in-
tended to receive or pay and paid the difference between the agreed price and
the market price at the time of settlement; no delivery of the goods was con-
templated by either party. Suit was under two statutes, one condemning trans-
actions such as the above as unlawful and another authorizing the recovery
contended for here when a gaming contract is involved. Held, that an agree-
ment such as this is not a gaming contract within the statute and hence this
cause of action is not good as against a general demurrer, Lasseter v. O'Neill,
(Ga. 1926) 135 S. E. 78.
This case is of interest particularly because of a seemingly justifiable dissent-
ing opinion by Judge Hines, in which he says in effect that in view of the great
prevalence of gaming and gambling, this section of the code (the one providing
for recovery of money) should not be emasculated by limiting it to the forms
of gambling enumerated in the opinion of the majority, such as games with
cards, dice, etc., but should be held applicable to all forms of gaming and
gambling. Undoubtedly at common law, money or property lost in a gaming
transaction and voluntarily paid over by the loser could not be recovered by
him from the winner, Davies v. Porter, 248 F. 397, 160 C. C. A. 407; unless some
fraud or unfairness was involved, Morris v. Philpot, 11 Ind. 447. But today
we have statutes which materially change this old doctrine. That states may
enact statutes for suppression of gambling and incidentally legislate against
dealing in "futures" is well settled, State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39.
In line with this, it has also been held that statutes providing for recovery of
money lost at gaming are constitutional, Anderson v. Metropolitan Stock Ex-
change, 191 Mass. 117, 77 N. E. 706. The only remaining question is the con-
struction of these statutes. It is held that such statutes invalidating gambling
transactions and providing for a recovery of money are remedial rather than
penal in their nature and hence should be liberally construed, Mendora v. Levy,
98 App. Div. 326, 90 N. Y. S. 748. In view of this statement it would seem that
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